In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self-interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long-term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions.
INTRODUCTION
The idea that compensation is an important governance mechanism is a fundamental assumption of executive compensation theory and practice (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Research examining this assumption has generated rich insight into how CEOs' own compensation influences both their perceptions and behavioral outcomes (Devers et al., 2008; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Sanders, 2001; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007) . Other related evidence, however, suggests that the results of CEOs' comparisons of their own pay to that of their peers' (CEO relative pay standing) may exhibit even more salient influences on CEOs' perceptions and behavioral responses than does their own pay in isolation (e.g., Folger and Cropanzano, 1998; Goodman, 1974) . More specifically, drawing on extensive evidence showing that employees tend to view pay as reflective of one's perceived worth (e.g., skills, knowledge, effort) to their firms (Wade, O'Reilly III, and Pollock, 2006) , scholars have argued that when individuals believe they are underpaid relative to peers, feelings of inequity arise (Brown, Sturman, and Simmering, 2003; Greenberg, 1990; Pfeffer and Langton, 1993) .
Further, considerable evidence has shown that employees respond to relative underpayment with remedial actions designed to achieve perceived pay equity (Bloom, 1999; Bloom and Michel, 2002; Cosier and Dalton, 1983; Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Fredrickson, DavisBlake, and Sanders, 2010; Janssen, 2001 ).
Some scholars have drawn on this research to examine the role of relative pay in the CEO setting. This work has provided some preliminary evidence that CEO relative pay standing, or the degree to which CEOs are underpaid or overpaid as compared to their peers, appears to have implications for firm size, CEO turnover (Fong, Misangyi, and Tosi, 2010) and compensation (Ezzamel and Watson, 1998) .
1 However, the specific actions underpaid CEOs may take in response to underpayment and whether those actions result in subsequent pay increases remain unclear. Drawing on evidence that CEOs can receive significant personal benefits from acquiring other firms, we develop and test a more complete theoretical explanation of whether, when, and how CEO relative pay standing influences CEO acquisition behavior and subsequent pay.
Gaining a deeper understanding of the antecedents of acquisition activity is an important endeavor. Research has consistently demonstrated that acquisitions typically generate unstable and, often, negative firm returns (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; King et al., 2004; Schijven and Hitt, 2012) . Nevertheless, evidence has shown that CEOs can derive significant personal benefits, such as increased discretion, visibility, prominence, power, and pay from acquiring other firms (Chen, Hambrick, and Pollock, 2008; Hambrick, Finkelstein, and Mooney, 2005; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996) . Recent research suggests that these factors are especially salient to underpaid CEOs, as they likely perceive they are undervalued and underappreciated, compared to peers leading similar firms with comparable characteristics and performance (Fong et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006) . Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that CEOs who acquire primarily for self-interested reasons (e.g., increasing subsequent pay) simultaneously perceive increased downside risk related to those acquisitions and, thus, engage in actions intended to minimize that risk (Devers et al., 2013) .
Specifically, scholars suggest that when acquirers are uncertain about the value creation potential of their acquisitions, they tend to finance deals with higher levels of stock, to help offset that risk (Schijven and Hitt, 2012) .
Our study draws on this work to offer important theoretical and empirical contributions to the executive compensation, corporate governance, and merger and acquisition (M&A) literatures. First, we propose that negative relative pay standing will motivate CEOs to attempt to increase their subsequent pay by making acquisitions. Our results support this prediction by showing that CEO negative relative standing status positively influences acquisition behavior. Second, we propose and find support for the argument that underpaid CEOs who acquire will endeavor to mitigate the risk associated with those deals by financing those acquisitions with a greater percentage of stock (Haleblian et al., 2009 ). Third, we argue that CEOs who make acquisitions under negative relative pay standing conditions will increase their pay (Ezzamel and Watson, 1998) . We further argue that acquisition activity will exhibit a positive influence on subsequent CEO pay, beyond that of firm growth. In support, we find that acquisitions appear to offer acquiring CEOs greater opportunities to increase their compensation than simply increasing firm size. Our results further show that acquisition activity partially mediates the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent compensation increases. Finally, in line with our argument that CEO underpayment elicits self-interested motives for acquiring, we further predict that the directors of firms led by CEOs who make acquisitions under negative relative pay standing conditions will be more likely to fund subsequent CEO pay increases with longterm pay, than short-term pay, to more tightly align their CEOs' interests with those of shareholders. Our findings support this prediction by showing that, although underpaid CEOs who acquire tend to successfully increase their pay, those increases derive primarily from long term, incentive-based compensation awards.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Scholars have long emphasized the symbolic nature of pay. In this regard, Barnard (1938:145) , argued that 'the real value of differences of monetary reward lies in the recognition or distinction assumed to be conferred. ' Lawler (1966) Although CEO labor markets are far from efficient in terms of supply and demand (Crystal, 1991; Khurana, 2002) , these markets are often viewed as informationally efficient, particularly in terms of CEO compensation (Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; Fong et al., 2010) .
For example, executive search firms collect and disseminate copious amounts of information regarding top executive pay (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Khurana, 2002) . Executive networks and interlocking directors responsible for selecting, evaluating, and compensating CEOs also facilitate compensation information transparency (Davis and Greve, 1997; Haunschild, 1993) .
In addition, other sources, such as compensation consultants, business media outlets, annual proxy statements and reports, etc. also contribute to the wide distribution of executive compensation figures. The extensive availability of executive pay information facilitates pay comparisons and, thus, renders CEOs' relative pay standing highly visible to those and other CEOs, their firms' internal and external stakeholders, and the public (Finkelstein et al., 2009) .
Given the salience of pay, it follows that CEOs 'keep track of their relative standing' (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 311) .
CEO behavioral responses to negative relative pay standing
Scholars have long argued that the results of pay comparisons can motivate significant behavioral consequences (Adams, 1963; Ambrose and Kulik, 1999; Heneman and Judge, 2000) . Indeed, individuals tend to view pay as reflective of one's ability, worth, and social status (Frank, 1985; Mitchell and Mickel, 1999) . This relative view of compensation, often grounded in equity, justice, and social comparison theories (e.g., Adams, 1965; Festinger, This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 1954), has shown that individuals gauge the perceived fairness of their pay via peer pay comparisons and, further, that the results of these comparisons can significantly influence their perceptions and behaviors. This, and related work, has further shown that individuals who perceive they are underpaid relative to peers experience feelings of inequity (Greenberg, 1990; Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Trevor and Wazeter, 2006) . In turn, those underpaid individuals tend to engage in remedial actions aimed at restoring perceived pay fairness (Bloom, 1999; Bloom and Michel, 2002; Connelly et al., forthcoming; Cosier and Dalton, 1983; Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008; Janssen, 2001 ).
Building on this work, Fong and colleagues (2010) recently argued and found that CEO relative underpayment positively influenced subsequent firm growth. Although this finding provided initial insight into an important consequence of underpayment in the CEO context, the specific actions underpaid CEOs may take to grow their firms and whether such growth influences subsequent CEO pay remain unclear. We attempt to advance this line of research by proposing that CEOs will respond to relative underpayment by engaging in measures they feel hold the potential to raise their relative standing (increase their pay).
Specifically, we argue that CEO negative relative pay standing will positively influence acquisition activity, as underpaid CEOs attempt to better align their pay with that of peers.
We further predict that such acquisition activity will positively influence the subsequent pay of those underpaid CEOs, beyond what increases to firm size might produce.
Acquisition behavior
We develop our theory by drawing on evidence showing that CEOs can derive significant personal benefits from acquiring other firms (Haleblian et al., 2009) . Specifically, recent research demonstrates that the value of acquiring firm CEOs' compensation awards increases following acquisitions, often irrespective of subsequent acquisition performance (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007) . These pay increases are due, in part, to the conventional assumption that managing larger firms requires greater cognitive ability and executive skill than managing smaller firms (e.g., Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Smith and Watts, 1992) . Therefore, higher pay is often assumed necessary to attract and/or retain CEOs who have the capabilities and skills to lead large firms (Fulmer, 2009; Haleblian et al., 2009; Rosen, 1986) . In a related vein, acquisitions typically heighten the complexity of acquiring firms, which, in turn, can enhance CEOs' discretion and bargaining power, potentially increasing their ability to negotiate more lucrative future compensation contracts (Carpenter and Seo, 2007; Hambrick et al., 2005; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996) . In support, research has shown that acquiring another firm typically increases CEOs' pay much more quickly than does internal or organic growth (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Harford and Li, 2007; Shelton, 1988) . More recently, drawing on Bliss and Rosen's (2001: 110) argument that, 'even mergers which reduce shareholder value can be in a manager's private interest,' Devers and colleagues (2013) suggested that personal interests, such as increasing compensation, discretion, and power, may actually provide the motivating forces behind many CEOs' acquisition decisions.
Given that pay tends to reflect individuals' competence and worth (Fulmer, 2009; Mitchell and Mickel, 1999; O'Reilly III, Main, and Crystal, 1988; Tang, 1992; Wade et al., 2006) , it is no surprise that CEOs are sensitive to their relative pay standing (Finkelstein et al., 2009 et al., 2013) . Given our argument that CEOs with negative relative pay standing will seek to acquire to increase their own pay, we expect that underpaid acquiring CEOs may sense additional uncertainty about the success of potential acquisitions and, thus, although they still are intent on acquiring, they will focus on mitigating the downside potential of doing so.
The research above suggests that although underpaid CEOs will perceive acquisitions as an instrument to increase their pay, they will simultaneously work to mitigate their personal downside exposure from those investments. Thus, we argue that underpaid CEOs' desire to reduce such downside potential will manifest in how they finance acquisitions. Specifically, acquirers generally finance acquisitions with cash, stock, or some combination (Haleblian et al., 2009) . Payment in stock, as opposed to cash, allows the acquiring firm and its investors to share some of the acquisition-related risk with the acquired firm and its owners (Hansen, 1987; Martin, 1996) . As such, when acquiring CEOs are highly certain about an acquisition's ability to generate returns they are likely to use cash to ensure they capture the full value of the gains associated with that acquisition (Carow, Heron, and Saxton, 2004) . However, when acquirers question the value enhancing potential of acquisitions, they tend to finance deals with higher levels of stock, to help offset risk (Schijven and Hitt, 2012) . We argued earlier that given their potentially self-interested motives for acquiring, underpaid CEOs may not be highly certain about the long-term value creation potential of their impending acquisitions.
Therefore, we propose that underpaid CEOs who acquire will rely more on stock as an acquisition payment method. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. When acquisitions are made, CEO negative relative pay standing will positively influence the use of stock as a payment method.
Subsequent Pay Change
We develop our final arguments by integrating evidence from pay fairness research (e.g., equity, justice, and social comparison) with executive compensation, governance, and M&A scholarship to propose that acquisition activity partially mediates the effect of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent pay. Specifically, as discussed earlier, the assumption that overseeing larger, complex firms requires greater cognitive capabilities and skills than overseeing smaller, less complex firms is common (e.g., Haleblian et al., 2009; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Smith and Watts, 1992) . Given acquisitions typically increase firm complexity and scope, acquiring CEOs' often accrue increased visibility, prominence, decision-making discretion, and bargaining power, which can potentially raise their ability to negotiate more lucrative future compensation contracts (Carpenter and Seo, 2007; Hambrick et al., 2005; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996) .
CEO compensation contracts are structured through intense negotiations, involving
CEOs, compensation committee members and, often, consultants and investors (Miller, 1995) .
The intensity of such negotiations increase when the relative attractiveness of CEOs' pay is low (Gerhart and Rynes, 1991) . We argued earlier that CEOs in negative relative pay standing will seek to acquire to increase their compensation. As a consequence, we expect underpaid acquiring CEOs to enthusiastically point to increases in firm complexity and scope to help justify arguments for higher pay (Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996) . We expect this, together with the potential increased bargaining power received from acquiring, to positively impact underpaid CEOs ability to influence their subsequent pay (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Chen et al., 2008; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Hambrick et al., 2005; Harford and Li, 2007; Henderson and Fredrickson, 1996; Pollock, Porac, and Wade, 2004) . Further, although firm size has been shown to positively influence compensation (Tosi et al., 2000) , we propose that acquisitions may allow underpaid CEOs to increase their compensation beyond the potential effect of firm growth. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3. Acquisition activity (controlling for change in firm size) is: a) positively related to subsequent pay change and b) partially mediates the relationship between CEO negative relative pay standing and subsequent pay change.

Long-term and short-term pay
We posited above that underpaid CEOs will receive pay increases following acquisitions. We further develop our understanding of this relationship by examining how those pay increases are structured. Specifically, we argue that pay increases that follow underpaid CEOs' acquisition activity are more likely to take the form of incentive-based long-term pay than short-term cash-based pay.
As we argued, we expect underpaid CEOs to attempt to resolve their negative relative standing. Self-interest underlies our theorizing, in that we propose underpaid CEOs may view acquisitions as a means of increasing their own subsequent compensation, and acquire accordingly. Research has shown that CEOs have a great deal of freedom in undertaking actions, such as acquisitions (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007) . Nevertheless, directors are expected to ensure that their CEOs are engaging in behaviors designed to enhance firm value (Devers et al., 2008) . Thus, when underpaid CEOs make acquisitions, their acquiring firm directors may sense the possibility that self-interest has motivated those acquisition decisions and, in turn, perceive potential misalignment of CEOs' and shareholders' interests.
Given the difficulties and costliness of directly monitoring CEO behaviors, directors have sought new ways to align CEOs interests with those of shareholders. Considerable governance research has shown that directors' primary alternative alignment mechanism is long-term incentive pay (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007) . This research suggests that, if acquiring firm directors suspect the possibility of self-interest regarding their underpaid CEOs' intentions for acquiring, they will seek to more tightly align CEO-shareholder interests by tying their CEOs' pay to performance, via long-term pay forms, during the subsequent compensation structuring period. Therefore, although we expect directors to award underpaid CEOs higher pay following their acquisitions, we propose this increase is more likely to take the form of longterm, than short-term pay. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. Underpaid CEOs' acquisition activity is more likely to lead to subsequent long-term pay increases than subsequent short-term pay increases.
METHODS
Sample
To test our hypotheses, we used longitudinal panel data with a sample that consisted of the 
Dependent variables
Acquisition Activity
To test our hypotheses regarding the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on CEO acquisition activity and the direct and mediation effects of acquisition activity on subsequent change in CEO pay, we measured total acquisitions as the number of acquisitions announced during a year and subsequently completed. Our use of the count measure of acquisition activities is consistent with previous studies and, therefore, facilitates a rigorous comparison between the current study's findings and those of previous studies (Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Sanders, 2001) . We also captured a separate measure of acquisition activity that included only large acquisitions, calculated as the number of acquisitions whose total deal size was greater than 1 million dollars. We winsorized the extreme 1% of the distribution of acquisition activity variables to reduce the effects of extreme observations. Results without winsorizing were completely consistent with those reported.
Payment method
To test our hypothesis regarding the impact of CEO negative relative pay standing on payment method, following McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes (2008) 
CEO subsequent pay change
Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 4 proposed that acquisition activity would mediate the relationship between CEO negative relative pay standing and subsequent CEO pay increases. The dependent variable in Hypotheses 3a and 3b is change in total compensation. To capture change in total compensation, we used the total CEO compensation each firm publically reported during each year of our sample. We simultaneously controlled for the previous year's total compensation (Graffin, Boivie, and Carpenter, 2013) . This method allowed us to partial out the influence of previous year total compensation from current year total compensation (Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Dunlap, Dietz, and Cortina, 1997; Firebaugh and Gibbs, 1985) , thus, avoiding the problems that difference scores produce when used as a dependent variable (Edwards, 1994 (Edwards, , 1995 
Independent variables
Following previous research, we operationalized CEO relative pay standing by taking the residuals from the regression of CEO total pay on important determinants of CEO total pay (Ambrose and Kulik, 1999; Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Fong et al., 2010; Levine, 1993; Wade et al., 2006; Wowak, Hambrick, and Henderson, 2011) . First, we constructed the following equation that included firm size, performance, human capital, and CEO labor market membership as determinants of CEO compensation (O'Reilly III et al., 1988) :
We captured firm size through firm sales and firm assets. As is typical, firm sales and firm assets were highly skewed, and thus, we used the natural logarithm of these variables in the equation. We used ROA and shareholder return to measure firm performance. Following O'Reilly III et al. (1988) , we used CEO tenure (number of years in the CEO role) as the proxy for CEO human capital. Because research has suggested that the value of CEO human capital This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved decreases for long-tenured CEOs (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995), we added the square of CEO tenure to our model. We also included additional variables to account for the effects of CEO labor market membership because our theory posits that CEOs will compare their pay to that of their labor market peers. We controlled for each specific labor market by including dummy codes for industry groups, based on SIC 2-digit codes. Further, recent evidence suggests that directors, executives, and external stakeholders appear to make comparisons within the different S&P indices (Cadman, Klasa and Matsunga, 2010 
Control variables
We included several variables in our analyses to control for the influence of factors that might otherwise explain our results. First, we controlled for prior firm performance using return on assets (ROA). We also controlled for free cash flow (Haunschild, 1993; McNamara et al., 2008) , and diversification, operationalized as the entropy measure (Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994; Palepu, 1985; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001) . To be consistent with prior research, we controlled for firm size by creating a composite factor using principal components analysis (PCA; Jackson, 1991) based on the natural logarithm of sales and the natural logarithm of number of employees (Fong et al., 2010; Tosi et al., 2004) .
When examining whether the impact of acquisitions on subsequent pay change exceeded that of changes in firm size (for Hypotheses 3 and 4), we operationalized change in firm size as (firm size t -firm size t-1 )/ firm size t-1 (Fong, et al., 2010) . In addition, since firmspecific resources may impact acquisition decisions, we included firm R&D expense as a control variable. Because R&D expenditures are frequently not reported in the Compustat database, we followed prior research and assumed an R&D value of 0 if the data was missing (e.g., Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick, 2006; O'Brien, 2003) . Not including R&D expenditures in our analyses provided results consistent with those reported.
Given the importance of CEO power in executive decision making, we controlled CEO power by constructing a composite variable (using PCA) comprised of three different measures: CEO tenure relative to directors' average tenure, the proportion of directors appointed by the current CEO, and CEO duality; a dichotomous variable set to '1' if the CEO was board chair and '0' if not (Boeker, 1992; Main, O'Reilly III, and Wade, 1995; Wade, O'Reilly III, and Chandratat, 1990; Zajac, 1994, 2001 ). To account for CEO change, we used a dichotomous variable set '1' if there was a change in CEO for the firm in that year and '0' if no change occurred. We also controlled for CEO pay structure by using the ratio of long-term pay to total pay (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002) . In addition, because researchers have found that board vigilance may associate with acquisition activity (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990 ) and executive compensation (Daily et al., 1998) , we controlled for board independence, using the proportion of unaffiliated outside directors.
To account for industry conditions we included control variables that captured industry dynamism and industry munificence. Following prior research, we regressed industry sales on a year-count variable for the five year period ending in the focal year. The standard error of the regression coefficient divided by mean industry sales is used as a measure for industry dynamism while the regression coefficient divided by mean industry sales is used as a measure for industry munificence (Dess and Beard, 1984; McNamara et al., 2008) . To control any unmeasured period-specific effects, we included dummy codes for each year.
Finally, in models in which the dependent variable was either the number or the characteristics of acquisitions, we controlled for the previous periods' number of acquisitions.
Analysis
We used a random-effects negative binomial regression model to test the CEO relative pay standing-acquisition activity hypothesis, because the dependent variable was a count variable.
Negative binomial regression is appropriate for a count variable when the variable's variance exceeds its mean (i.e., overdispersion; Sanders, 2001) . We also estimated the model using the random-effects Poisson regression model and found no material differences in our results.
For all other models we use generalized estimating equations (GEE) which is appropriate for analyzing panel data where there are measures repeated over time (Henderson et al., 2006; Liang and Zeger, 1986; Ndofor, Sirmon, and He, 2011; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012) . This analytical technique is appropriate for our study, as we explored the impact of CEO underpayment relative to peer CEOs in their respective labor markets. We also tested our models using random effects regression and all results were consistent with those reported This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved here. Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for each of the variables as well as their bivariate correlations. The results from the random-effects negative binomial regression model used to examine whether underpaid CEOs were more likely to engage in acquisition activity are reported in Table 2 . As earlier noted, we used both the number of total acquisitions and the number of large acquisitions to test our hypotheses. Table 1 about here*** *** Insert Table 2 about here*** Models 1 and 3 of Table 2 report the effects of our control variables on acquisition activity. As expected, the effects of several of the control variables were significant. With regard to our variables of interest, with Hypothesis 1, we predicted that CEO negative relative pay standing would positively influence acquisition activity. The coefficients for CEO underpayment in both Model 2 and Model 4 were positive and significant in predicting both the total number of acquisitions (p < .01) and number of large acquisitions (p < .001),
RESULTS
*** Insert
demonstrating that CEO relative underpayment was positively associated with the total number of acquisitions and total number of large acquisitions, thus supporting Hypothesis 1.
The results for our tests of Hypothesis 2 are shown in Table 3 . Given our predictions, these tests were restricted to situations in which acquisitions occurred. Hypothesis 2 predicted that CEO negative relative pay standing would positively influence the level of stock used to finance acquisitions. Models 1 and 3 report the results of control variables only, while Models 2 and 4 provide the tests of this hypothesis. As seen in Models 2 and 4, the coefficients for CEO underpayment were positive and significant (p < .001), when the dependent variable was the level of stock used for all acquisitions and large acquisitions.
Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. Hypothesis 3b predicted that acquisition activity would partially mediate the relationship between CEO negative relative pay standing and subsequent total pay change.
The results from these models, combined with those from Table 2 , allowed us to test for mediation using the product of coefficients approach (Alwin and Hauser, 1975; Sobel, 1982) .
Specifically, we computed the indirect effect as the product of the coefficients of those paths and tested for significance using Sobel's (1982) standard error formula. This approach allowed us to quantify the effect by performing a significance test for mediation. This approach is common in management research and has been particularly emphasized as appropriate for research using large samples (Koopman, Howe, and Hollenbeck, forthcoming; MacKinnon et al., 2002; Stone and Sobel, 1990 ). As noted above, the main effect of CEO underpayment on total compensation was positive and significant (p < .001).
Further, the product of the coefficient test was significant both when considering all acquisitions and only large acquisitions (p <.05). As such, Hypothesis 3b was also supported.
To test Hypothesis 4, we separated total compensation changes into short-term and long-term compensation changes. Hypothesis 4 predicted that acquisition activity would be more likely to lead to subsequent long-term pay increases than subsequent short-term pay increases. To test this hypothesis we first examined the coefficient of number of acquisitions in predicting subsequent changes in short-term pay. Models 5 and 6 of Table 4 show that the effects of the total number of acquisitions and number of large acquisitions on short-term pay changes were not significant. On the other hand, as Models 8 and 9 of Table 4 show, the coefficient for acquisition behavior on subsequent changes in long-term pay was positive and significant, both for total acquisitions and large acquisitions (p < .001), thereby supporting Hypothesis 4.
In a supplemental analysis we tested the partial mediation effect of acquisition activity on changes in long-term compensation. The partial mediation was significant both for total acquisitions (p < .05) and large acquisitions (p < .01). Taken together, as predicted, while acquisition activity does mediate the association between CEO negative relative standing and pay increases, it does so primarily through changes in long-term compensation awards. Table 4 about here***
DISCUSSION
The purpose of our study was to develop a more complete theoretical understanding of the effects of relative pay standing on CEO behavior. We believe that our results make several contributions to the executive compensation, corporate governance, and merger and acquisition (M&A) literatures. First, scholars have long sought to understand why CEOs acquire other firms when evidence has consistently shown that such investments typically fail to produce positive acquirer value (Haleblian et al., 2009) . Recent research, however, has begun to reveal that CEOs often accrue substantial personal benefits from acquiring other firms, often with little regard to acquisition performance (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007) . Such benefits are particularly important to underpaid CEOs who likely feel undervalued, relative to their peers (Fong et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006) . Drawing on this work, we proposed and demonstrated that negative relative pay standing status motivates CEOs to make acquisitions, presumably in order to better align their pay with that of peers.
Second, we argued that when self-interested motives (e.g., increasing subsequent pay) underlie decisions to acquire, CEOs will tend to perceive downside risk related to those acquisitions and, thus, attempt to manage that risk (Devers et al., 2013) . In line with this proposition, we argued that CEOs who acquire under negative relative pay standing conditions will respond to impending downside potential by financing their acquisitions more heavily with stock, than cash, to transfer some of the risk associated with those deals from their firms to target firms (Hansen, 1987; Martin, 1996; Schijven and Hitt, 2012) . Our findings are consistent with this prediction, thereby showing that the firm risk associated with acquisitions is not lost on underpaid CEOs. However, rather than refraining from acquisition behavior, altogether, underpaid CEOs take measures to offset this risk. We believe this suggests that remedying negative relative pay standing may take precedence over serving shareholder interests. To this point, we encourage other research that examines how alternative corporate governance mechanisms and pay arrangements may affect underpaid CEOs' strategic investment behaviors.
Third, we find that underpaid CEOs who acquire appear to increase their pay. We also show that that acquisition activity partially mediates the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent compensation increases, even when controlling for changes in firm size. Scholars have shown that firm size is a chief driver of CEO compensation (Tosi et This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved al., 2000) . Indeed, an assumption exists that acquiring CEOs may acquire simply to increase firm size (Haleblian et al., 2009) . However, our results demonstrate that acquisitions appear to offer additional pecuniary benefits above those provided by firm size enhancements.
Although data and space limitation restricted our ability to expressly examine the specific factors that provide this CEO compensation premium, we speculate that the increased discretion, visibility, prominence, and bargaining power that accompany acquisitions are likely strong predictors. We encourage future work that continues to uncover the multilayered drivers of CEO pay.
Fourth, although our findings demonstrate that underpaid acquiring CEOs do increase their subsequent pay, those increases are funded predominantly by long term, incentive-based compensation awards. Scholars have long argued that directors rely on long-term incentive grants to better align CEOs' interests with those of shareholders (c.f., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Our finding suggests that although directors of firms led by underpaid CEOs might originally approve acquisitions, they may eventually sense the possibility that their CEOs may have acquired for self-interested reasons and, thus, seek to remedy such potential interest misalignment by more strongly linking their CEOs' pay to firm outcomes in the subsequent compensation structuring period. Nevertheless, it may also be that directors fail to exercise adequate vigilance, or worse, also act self-interested with regard to ratifying acquisitions. For example, while association with larger, more prominent firms is beneficial for CEOs, directors also profit from such ties (Chen et al., 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Pollock et al., 2004) . In this way, directors too, can receive substantial benefits from acquisition-related growth. This suggests that directors, whether they are self-interested or just simply not vigilant, may eventually rely on long-term incentive pay awards as a substitute for the adequate vetting of acquisition prospects. Although examining this question is beyond the reach of this work, we suggest delving deeper into the decision-making processes that drive directors' acquisition-related responses will further advance our understanding of M&A and governance practices.
Further, Fong and colleagues (2010) found that CEO underpayment was positively associated with subsequent CEO departure. In a supplemental analysis, we, similarly, found that CEO underpayment exhibited a strong positive influence on subsequent CEO change.
Combining Fong and colleagues' (2010) findings with our results showing that CEO underpayment is positively associated with acquisition behavior after controlling for CEO turnover, suggests some important avenues for future research. Specifically, scholars have found that individuals frame situations as gains and losses around reference points, both in general (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , and with regard to their compensation (Devers, et al., 2008; Larraza-Kintana, Gomez-Mejia, and Wiseman, 2011; Larraza-Kintana, et al., 2007; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) . Scholars have also held that managers tend to perceive two such reference points as salient: a success reference point and a survival reference point (e.g., Lopes, 1987; Shapira, 1995; March and Shapira, 1987, 1992) .
Nevertheless, managers are argued to focus on one reference point at any given time (March and Shapira, 1987, 1992) .
We argued earlier that underpaid CEOs will engage in self-interested actions in response to negative relative pay standing. Thus, it may be that when some CEOs are underpaid, they remain focused on 'success' and continue to acquire because they view acquisitions as potential pay and power equalizers. However, given CEO negative relative standing can reflect low director and shareholder backing (David, Kochhar, and Levitas, 1998) , other underpaid CEOs may sense employment risk and, thus, turn their attention toward 'survival' (Lopes, 1987; Shapira, 1995) . We suggest that such a survival mindset may motivate underpaid CEOs to seek out new positions, or retire, to avoid the threats to their reputations and financial, human, and social capital the stigma of termination may This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved present (Fong, et. al., 2010; Semadeni et al., 2008; Simon and Houghton, 2003 Although our results suggest that CEO overpayment does not influence acquisition activity, they do show negative relationships between CEO overpayment and subsequent total, shortterm, and long-term pay changes. While interesting, we suggest more fine-grained research is required to develop a more complete understanding of the influence of CEO overpayment on CEO actions and subsequent pay.
In conclusion, we believe that the results of our study underscore the importance of relative pay standing for executive compensation, corporate governance, and M&A theories and practices. We hope our theory and findings provide additional motivation to scholars seeking to advance our understanding of how CEO pay comparisons influence CEOs', directors, and other stakeholders' perceptions and responses. 
